Max Boot has written an article outlining how he thinks the war for stability can be won.
Since February, General David Petraeus and his team in Baghdad have been implementing classic counterinsurgency precepts that have worked wherever they have been tried in adequate strength over a sustained period of time–from the Philippines and South Africa in the early 1900s to Malaya in the 1950s, El Salvador in the 1980s, and Northern Ireland in the 1990s. They are surging more troops into troubled areas and pushing them off the remote fortress-like Forward Operating Bases and into neighborhoods where they conduct foot patrols, erect concrete barriers, and establish a street-level sense of security. The situation in Anbar province has improved substantially, and, while the areas around Baghdad remain deeply troubled, there are signs of progress in the capital itself. (Sectarian murders are down two-thirds since January, though deaths from spectacular suicide bombings remain high.)
Among the tips:
- More prisons
- An "identity database"
- More aggressive pursuit of foreign fighters
- Streamline the U.S. command bureaucracy
- Better management of rebuilding projects
- Better command accountability
- Increase the size of the Iraqi Army
Boot suggests that Iraq can become stable without any of these measures being implemented. I’m torn. I spent a year of my life in Iraq. The situation, especially in Baghdad, is terrible for the average Iraqi. I think the single most important factor in turning around the insurgency is basic security. If the Iraqi Army, with help from the Coalition, can provide basic security, then the country will turn around. Removing the influence of agitators like Moqtada al-Sadr is also critical.